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DOES AN ASSET MANAGER HAVE
STANDING UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS?
BRIAN P. MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, amidst much fanfare and after millions of dollars in
campaign contributions, Congress enacted the first substantive
amendments to the two cornerstone acts of the federal securities
laws since they were passed in the 1930s.' Entitled the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA"), 2 one of
its purposes is to attract large investors to serve as class
representative and fill the newly created position of "lead
plaintiff,"3 whose job it is to choose lead counsel and fulfill the
other responsibilities of a class representative.4 The theory
behind the lead plaintiff provision is that a plaintiff with a
greater economic stake in the litigation would more effectively
monitor and control lead counsel.'
* B.A., M.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D.; St. John's University School of
Law. Mr. Murray is a member of Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP.
' See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000) [hereinafter the
Securities Act]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)
[hereinafter the Exchange Act]. The Securities Act was enacted in 1933 with the
primary intent of regulating stock offerings. Congress enacted the Exchange Act in
1934 with the primary intent of regulating stock exchanges. The Exchange Act
established the Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee the implementation
of the two acts.
2 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
The PSLRA is codified mainly in two new sections in the Securities and Exchange
Acts. The PSLRA established section 27 of the Securities Act and section 21D of the
Exchange Act.
3 The only task specifically assigned to the lead plaintiff by statute is to choose
lead counsel. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). A "lead plaintiff' and a
"class representative" are not synonymous, as there can be only one lead plaintiff
(which can be comprised of a group) and many more class representatives named in
a complaint. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). Usually additional class representatives are named to ensure that the class
has standing to pursue all claims.
4 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B), 78u-4(a)(3)(B).
5 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 442 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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What was left unclear in the PSLRA was exactly who would
qualify as the large-investor plaintiff.6  Many people, and
institutions, delegate responsibility for managing their money to
asset managers or investment advisors.7  While title to the
account remains in the name of the owner, the decisions
concerning which securities to buy and sell and the actual
execution of the orders is handled by the asset manager. Further
complicating matters, an asset manager will sometimes have
purchased the stock for the accounts of multiple clients, so that
an issue arises as to whether the plaintiff is one person (the asset
manager) or a group of persons (the asset manager's clients).
This Article will discuss the rationale behind including or
excluding asset managers as lead plaintiffs or class
representatives and the various approaches taken by courts in
dealing with the issue.
I. THE PSLRA WAS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE INSTITUTIONAL
PLAINTIFFS TO STEP FORWARD
The legislative history of the PSLRA demonstrates that
Congress intended to encourage large investors and institutions
to serve as lead plaintiff!8 As the Statement of Managers in the
6 The PSLRA is also conspicuously silent regarding how to determine who has
the largest financial interest. Courts look to a number of factors, including the
number of shares purchased, the number of net shares purchased, total net funds
expended during the class period on the securities, and approximate losses. See
Perkins v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. (In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig.), 128 F. Supp. 2d
401, 409 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Laney v. Landry's Seafood Rests., Inc. (In re Landry's
Seafood Rest., Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. H-99-1948, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7005, at *5 n.3
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000); In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 217 (D.N.J.
1999); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Lax v.
First Merchs. Acceptance Corp., No. 97-C-2715, 1997 WL 461036, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 11, 1997).
' Asset managers and investment advisors will be referred to as "asset
managers" for the sake of brevity.
8 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. at 442 (noting that one purpose of
the PSLRA is to encourage institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff);
Bowman v. Legato Sys., Inc., 195 F.R.D. 655, 657 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("[The] large
institutional investor with significant monetary losses ... is exactly the type of lead
plaintiff envisioned by Congress .... ); In re Waste Mgmt, Inc. Sec. Litig., 128 F.
Supp. 2d at 411 (stating that one purpose of PSLRA is to encourage institutional
investors to serve as lead plaintiff); In re Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7005, at *9 (noting that the PSLRA expresses preference for
large institutional investors to act as lead plaintiff); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("[F]ramers of the Reform Act
envisioned that established institutional investors would take control of securities
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Joint Explanatory Statement on the Committee of Conference for
the PSLRA stated:
[The PSLRA] protects investors who join class actions against
lawyer-driven lawsuits by giving control of the litigation to lead
plaintiffs with substantial holdings of the securities of the
issuer ....
.. These provisions are intended to increase the likelihood that
parties with significant holdings in issuers, whose interests are
more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, will
participate in the litigation and exercise control over the
selection and actions of plaintiffs counsel.9
.. The Conference Committee seeks to increase the likelihood
that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by
requiring courts to presume that the member of the purported
class with the largest financial stake in the relief sought is the
"most adequate plaintiff."
.. Institutional investors and other class members with large
amounts at stake will represent the interests of the plaintiff
class more effectively than class members with small amounts
at stake.'0
Similarly, the Senate report on the PSLRA states: "The
Committee believes that increasing the role of institutional
investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class and
assist the courts."" An influential law review article cited
litigation."); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
(commenting that the PSLRA was enacted with the "explicit hope" that institutional
investors would step forward as lead plaintiffs); Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp.
542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that the PSLRA expresses preference for large
institutional investors to act as lead plaintiff).
9 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
10 Id. at 34.
COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URBAN AFFAIRS, PRIVATE SEC. LITIG. REFORM
ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995); see also In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the PSLRA was
designed to attract institutions or other sophisticated investors to act as lead
plaintiff); In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 104 (D.N.J. 1999) ("mhe
PSLRA 'ensure[s] that institutional plaintiffs with expertise in the securities market
and real financial interests in the integrity of the market would control the
litigation, not lawyers."') (alteration in original) (quoting In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec.
Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 ("These
provisions are intended to encourage the most capable representatives of the
plaintiff class to participate in class action litigation and to exercise supervision and
control of the lawyers for the class.").
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frequently in the legislative history of the PSLRA makes the
same points: "Institutional investors with large stakes in class
actions surely are more capable than typical figurehead plaintiffs
of effectively monitoring how plaintiffs' attorneys conduct such
litigation."12 The article further states that "[i]nstitutions with
the largest stakes in class actions are better situated than
plaintiffs' attorneys or courts to protect class members'
interests.""
The congressional goal in enacting the PSLRA was to
encourage investors with a substantial stake in the litigation to
serve as lead plaintiff and to provide input to the lawyers serving
the class. 14 When analyzing the question under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, one court has held that "the rule in Blue Chip
Stamps [requiring a plaintiff to be a purchaser] is not meant to
exclude institutional investors and money managers, but rather
should be interpreted broadly to include them as they are often
the parties who make investment decisions."' 5
II. PRECEDENT PRIOR TO THE PSLRA
Section 11 of the Securities Act states that "any person
acquiring such security" may sue. 6 There is no requirement
under the Securities Act that a plaintiff be an "owner" (i.e.,
beneficial holder) of the security at issue.17 A plaintiff need
merely be a "purchaser" of the security at issue.' i  Standing
under the Exchange Act is a somewhat more complicated matter
since, until 1995, the right to a private cause of action under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was a judicially created cause
of action not explicitly provided for in the statute.' 9 In 1975, the
12 Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104
YALE L.J. 2053, 2095 (1995).
1Id. at 212 1.
14 See Laney v. Landry's Seafood Rests., Inc. (In re Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc.
Sec. Litig.), No. H-99-1948, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7005, at *10-11 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
30, 2000); Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651, 661-62 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
'5 Alfaro v. Caprock Comm. Corp., No. 3:00-CV-1613-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21743, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000).
16 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000).
17 See id.
18 Id.
19 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 173 (1994) ("determining the elements of the 10b-5 private liability
scheme, has posed difficulty because Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause
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Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of who would have
standing under this private cause of action and held that a
plaintiff must be a "purchaser[] [or] seller[] of securities" to have
standing under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.2' Although
much ink has been spilled as to a purchaser versus a "holder" of
securities (one who buys before a fraud and continues to hold
during a fraud) or a non-purchaser (one who doesn't buy during
the fraud),21 there has been very little discussion as to who is
actually the purchaser when an asset manager is involved.
The issue as to whether an asset manager, with delegated
authority to make investment decisions for its clients, is a
purchaser pre-existed the PSLRA. This issue was addressed in
cases prior to 1995. In Monetary Management Group of St.
Louis, Inc. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,22 an asset manager
purchased bonds for its client's account and sought to rescind the
purchase upon learning the bonds were not marginable as
represented.23 The defendants moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the asset manager was not the real party in
interest. 4 The court began its analysis by looking at the express
language of section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 5 requiring a
plaintiff to be a "purchaser," rather than an "owner," as another
provision of the Exchange Act requires.26 The court held that
"the remedial purpose of [section] 12(2) warrants extension of the
term purchaser to one who purchases stock in its own name on
behalf of another., 27 Finally, the court held that since the client
was in privity with the asset manager, any judgment would be
res judicata as to the client, as well as to the asset manager.28
of action").
20 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
21 The issue of who is actually a "purchaser" dates back to Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), which held that stockholders who already
owned the stock and who received fraudulent mailings from the company did not
have standing under SEC Rule 10b-5. Id. at 462-63. The Supreme Court, in Blue
Chip Stamps, adopted the "Birnbaum Rule." 421 U.S. at 749.
22 604 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
23 Id. at 765-66.
24 Id. at 766.
25 Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act was known as section 12(2) prior to
1995. SECURITIES PRIMARY LAw SOURCEBOOK E-324 (A. A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 2005).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000) (requiring a plaintiff
to be an "owner" of the stock in question under section 16(b) to sue to recover short
swing profits).
27 Monetary Mgmt. Group of St. Louis, Inc., 604 F.Supp. at 767.
28 id.
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A few years after Monetary Management Group was decided,
the same issue arose again when a wife, who had been given
stock by her husband (purchased solely with the husband's
money), sued for securities fraud.29 The defendants moved to
dismiss, alleging that the wife was not a purchaser and thus had
no standing to sue.3 ° The court held that the "[d]efendant's
emphasis on the source of the funds and the name on the
account, however, [was] misplaced and did not resolve this issue.
The actual source of funds [was] not determinative of 10b-5
standing."'" The court further held that the determinative factor
for standing was the wife's level of involvement in the purchase
decision, and some involvement in the decision making, even if
de minimis, was required to qualify as a purchaser.3 2 "Investors
who only passively participate in an investment by transferring
full authority to make purchase decisions to an agent are not
purchasers."33  However, investors do not have to actually
perform the mechanics of the sale to be a purchaser, and the
court pointed out that trust beneficiaries can qualify as
purchasers, because the purchase requires their approval.34
In 1989, a magistrate judge in the Southern District of New
York held that an asset manager had standing to sue as a "real
party in interest" under the Securities Act.35 The court gave the
matter very little discussion, merely holding that the test was
whether the defendants would be afforded the protection of res
judicata when the case was over regardless of whether the asset
manager was acting for its own account or its clients' accounts
when it made the purchase.36
These decisions reflect adherence to the strict language of
29 Medline Indus., Inc. Employee Profit Sharing & Ret. Trust v. Blunt, Ellis &
Loewi, Inc., No. 89 C 4851, 1993 WL 13436, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1993).
30 Id. at *2.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.; see also Davidson v. Belcor, Inc., 933 F.2d 603, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1991)
(noting that a wife, who only had an interest in the proceeds of a sale of stock as the
result of a divorce agreement, was not a purchaser or seller since she had no input
into the sale of stock because her husband had sole authority to make decisions
concerning shares).
34 Medline Indus., 1993 WL 13436, at *2; see also Fin. Programs, Inc. v. Foss
Fin.., Inc., No. 72-848, 1973 WL 458 (D. Or. June 6, 1973) (holding that a broker who
merely acts as a conduit has no standing as a purchaser).
3' Lemanik, S.A. v. McKinley Allsopp, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 602, 604, 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
36 Id. at 607.
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the statute in the case of sections 11 or 12 ("any person
acquiring")37 or rule in the case of Rule 10b-5 ("in connection with
purchase or sale"),a" as well as the prudent policy determination
that an asset manager advisor is likely to be a good class
representative. These cases also demonstrate the practical
consideration that if the investment advisor is found to lack
standing, perhaps no one has standing.
III. POST-PSLRA DECISIONS
A. Cases Holding Asset Managers Can Be Lead Plaintiffs or
Class Representatives
An asset manager who purchases for a client's account often
has some, if not all, of the attributes viewed as desirable in a lead
plaintiff: sophistication, wealth, experience, and incentive to
achieve a large recovery. Although the purchase is not made
with the manager's own money, the asset manager's reputation
and credibility are on the line with the client, and an asset
manager has every incentive to achieve a recovery and get back
in its client's good graces. In addition, it is almost impossible to
get in a position to manage someone else's money without having
achieved a certain level of sophistication and experience in
financial matters.
In Ezra Charitable Trust v. Rent-Way, Inc.39 ("Rent-Way f'),
the court held that barring such desirable class representatives
would be a bad idea:
The restriction FSBA urges us to adopt would, in our view,
eliminate a number of potentially highly capable lead plaintiffs
based on an unduly narrow interpretation of "financial interest"
under the PSLRA. In this instance, we are satisfied that
Cramer has the requisite experience and incentive to serve as
lead plaintiff. Cramer has a significant financial interest in
attempting to recover the $10.1 million allegedly lost by its
clients in order to maintain their goodwill and future business.
Thus, Cramer's incentives to vigorously litigate this case
include business considerations not shared by the non-
management proposed lead plaintiffs.4 °
37 15 U.S.C. § 77k-1 (2000).
38 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
39 136 F. Supp. 2d 435 (W.D. Pa. 2001) [hereinafter Rent-Way 1].
40 Id. at 443; see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D.
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The Rent-Way I court continued, holding that "eliminating
an entire class of potential lead plaintiffs that may often be
strongly aligned with plaintiff classes as well as competent to
adequately oversee the efforts of counsel would not best serve the
purposes of the [PSLRA]. ''41 The court appointed the asset
manager as lead plaintiff, concluding that "Cramer's financial
interest is so aligned with its clients' financial interests that the
two are synonymous. 42
The opinion in Rent-Way I presages every argument and
issue raised concerning asset managers over the following three
years. First, the court noted, almost as an aside, that the asset
manager had submitted a declaration stating it was attorney-in-
fact for its clients and was authorized to bring suit on their
behalf.43 Although reliance on this fact was later disavowed by
the same court in In re Rent-Way Securities Litigation44 ('Rent-
Way If'), this statement would play a prominent role in two
decisions denying an asset manager the right to sue on its clients'
behalf.45 The court also noted that the asset manager made an
independent determination of which stocks to buy and sell for its
clients, and "[b]ecause of this unrestricted decision-making
authority, we conclude that Cramer is a 'purchaser' under the
federal securities laws with standing to sue in its own name. 46
343, 350-51 (D. Md. 2003) (stating that an asset manager is a sophisticated
institution with resources to support "a long and complex litigation"); Takeda v.
Turbodyne Tech, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 n.18 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that
an investment advisor's inclusion as lead plaintiff "will add sophistication to the
group's oversight of counsel, and will further the goals of the Reform Act"); Gluck v.
Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that an institutional
plaintiff is accustomed to acting in the role of fiduciary and its experience in
investing and financial matters will benefit the class).
4' Rent-Way I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 444. The Rent-Way I court noted that one
movant relied on Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Int'l Health Sci., Inc., No. Civ. A. 72-
1848, 1972 WL 350 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1972), for the proposition that an advisor who
acquires securities for a client is not a "purchaser." Rent-Way I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at
442. However, in Competitive Associates., the advisor didn't make the purchases in
question, which were made by other broker-dealers. 1972 WL 350, at *1. The
advisor's claim was based on a claim that its client had suffered a loss of assets, and
therefore, the advisor's asset-based management fee would be lower. Id. at *1-3.
42 Rent-Way I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 444.41 Id. at 441.
4 218 F.R.D. 101 (W.D. Pa. 2003) [hereinafter Rent-Way Il].
45 See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
4 Rent-Way , 136 F. Supp. 2d at 442; see also In re Northwestern Corp. Sec.
Litig., 299 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006-07 (D.S.D. 2003) (holding that a manager had
complete discretion and a significant financial and business interest in attempting a
[Vol. 79:405
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The court also noted the asset manager "has a significant
financial interest in attempting to recover the $10.1 million
allegedly lost by its clients in order to maintain their goodwill
and future business."47 Finally, the court rejected the contention
that a judgment against the asset manager would not afford
defendants the protection of res judicata against the client,
holding that the asset manager was in privity with the client and
that res judicata would apply as to the client.48  One of these
issues-attorney-in-fact, ability to independently choose which
stocks to buy, financial interest and goodwill, or res judicata-
would play a role in every decision to follow.
The Rent-Way I court revisited some of these issues on the
class certification decision in Rent-Way II.49 Class discovery had
revealed that the asset manager was not, in fact, empowered to
act as attorney-in-fact for its clients.5 ° The court held the power
to act as attorney-in-fact was not a "controlling factor."
51  The
court stated that its prior decision "was premised not on the
existence of such [attorney-in-fact] language but on the
undisputed authority Cramer possessed under the putative
agreement to 'independently determine[ ] which securities to
purchase for its clients' accounts."'52
Other courts have taken varying approaches to the question
of standing of asset managers. Some courts allow asset
managers to act as lead plaintiffs with little discussion of the
issue, while nevertheless acknowledging that it is an issue.53
recovery and therefore had standing); cf. In re Caremark Int'l Sec. Litig., No. 94 C
4751, 1996 WL 351182, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1996) (holding that a beneficial
owner who ceded all decision-making authority to an asset manager is not certified
as a class representative because it is not "typical"). When the decision-making
authority of the asset manager is not unrestricted, the client may have authority to
sue directly. See In re Neopharm, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 C 2976, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16287, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2004).
47 Rent-Way I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
48 Id.
41 Rent-Way I, 218 F.R.D. 101 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
'0 Id. at 106-07.
"' Id. at 107-08.
52 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rent-Way I, 136 F. Supp. 2d. at 442).
'Thus, our inquiry turns not on the presence or absence of specific 'attorney-in-fact'
language in the agreements, but on the level of discretion exercised by Cramer in the
day-to-day purchase of securities for its clients." Id. at 108.
53 See In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 298-99 (D. Del.
2003) (acknowledging an issue existed but certifying the asset manager); In re
Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (appointing an
asset manager as lead plaintiff). In Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v.
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One approach is to ask whether the asset manager has been
granted explicit authority to sue on behalf of its clients.5 4 One
court has held that if an asset manager has been granted
authority as attorney-in-fact to sue on behalf of its clients, then
the asset manager has standing.5 The court in Weinberg v. Atlas
Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., noted that mere authority to
purchase stock will not automatically confer standing to sue, but
relied on Rent- Way I in finding that an explicit grant of authority
as attorney-in-fact means an asset manager is "considered the
'purchaser' under the federal securities laws with standing to sue
in its own name. 56  A New Jersey court also held an asset
manager, who had complete investment authority and was
attorney-in-fact for the client, had standing to sue under the
Exchange Act. 7 In so doing, the court distinguished a previous
case before that court 8 (in which it declined to appoint an asset
manager) on the basis that there was no evidence in the previous
case that the asset manager was authorized to act on behalf of its
clients.5 9 One of the earliest decisions to treat the issue noted
that the manager had 'full and complete discretion and
authority to manage the securities of its clients, including the
authority to purchase and sell'. . . . Thus [it] has presented
sufficient evidence that it actually purchased the securities in
question, and had full authority to do so. 6 °
Honeywell International, Inc., No. 00-3605, 2000 WL 33173017 (D.N.J. Nov. 16,
2000), one of the lead plaintiffs was Congress Asset Management, but the opinion
did not state whether the firm was making purchases for its own or its clients'
accounts or discuss the asset manager/standing issue.
5 See Weinberg v. Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 248, 255
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
5' See id.; see also In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., No. 5:03CV2166,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27043, at *22-26, (N.D. Ohio May 12, 2004).
56 Weinberg, 216 F.R.D. at 255 (citing Rent-Way I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 442); see
also In re Constar Int'l Inc. Sec Litig., No 03-5020 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (appointing as co-
lead plaintiffs an individual and an asset manager that had "implicit, but not
explicit authority to institute suit under its customer agreement" because it
"appears to be in the best economic interests of the plaintiff class and provides a
good resolution of the issues presented by" the competing lead plaintiff motions).
17 Roth v. Knight Trading Group, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529-31 (D.N.J.
2002).
58 Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D.N.J. 2002); see
infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
'9 Roth, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
60 Alfaro v. Caprock Comm. Corp., No. 3:00-CV-1613-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21743, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000) (first alteration in original); see also Sofran v.
Labranche & Co., 220 F.R.D. 398, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting the argument
[Vol. 79:405
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Another approach is to focus not on an explicit grant of
authority from the client, but on the asset manager's
demonstrated interest in pursuing the case.6' In the case of
Newman v. Eagle Building Technologies, two members of a
proposed lead plaintiff group were banks that had "bought Eagle
securities on behalf of clients as opposed to buying the securities
for themselves., 62 Relying in part on Rent-Way I, the court held
that "[t]he fact that the banks bought the securities on behalf of
clients does not mean that the banks are inadequate lead
plaintiffs., 63 The court continued:
There is sufficient evidence in the record that the banks
do ... take this litigation seriously. The banks have knowingly
decided to participate in the prosecution of this action, have
declared their intent to actively participate in the litigation, and
have agreed to provide testimony at a deposition or at a trial.64
The Newman court did not discuss whether there had been
an explicit grant of authority, choosing to focus instead, as the
Rent-Way I court did, on issues of demonstrable interest and
adequacy. 6' The entire discussion of the issue, however, consists
of a single paragraph.
One of the more recent opinions touches on all the factors
discussed above. In Casden v. HPL Technologies, Inc.,66 the court
focused on the sophistication and investment discretion of the
asset manager. 6' Three parties moved for appointment as lead
plaintiff, one of whom was an asset manager who purchased the
shares for the accounts of five clients.68 Record title was held by
the asset manager and beneficial ownership was held by the
client.69 The court noted the experience and sophistication of the
asset manager in investment matters and also noted that it had
served as lead plaintiff in four other actions.70  "Thus, it is
that there was no evidence of actual authority to sue on behalf of clients because
Congress expressed a preference "for having institutional investors as lead
plaintiffs").
6' Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Tech., 209 F.R.D. 499, 506 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
62 id.
63 id.
64Id.
65 Id. at 504-06.
66 No. C-02-3510 VRW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19606 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2003).
67 Id. at *23-25, *27.
68 Id. at *9.
69 Id. at *21-22.
70 Id. at *24-25.
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apparent that Fuller & Thaler has both professional experience
and sophistication in the realms of securities and securities
litigation."'" The court discussed the issue of record versus
beneficial ownership and concluded that "despite its lack of
beneficial ownership, Fuller & Thaler retains a great deal of
control over the securities it purchased. It has 'full and complete
investment discretion and decision-making authority with
respect to the securities it purchases for its clients' accounts."'
Finally, the court held that the asset manager qualified as the
real party interest in the action, because it actually
consummated the purchase of the securities and made the actual
investment decisions.73
B. Courts Holding Asset Managers Can't Act as Lead Plaintiffs
Courts that deny asset managers standing to sue will often
focus on the literal standing of the plaintiff. Noting that the
asset manager did not purchase the stock with its own funds but
instead with its clients' funds, a court in the Southern District of
New York held that the fact that the asset manager was not the
legal purchaser of the stock precluded it from serving as a
plaintiff.74 In In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Securities
Litigation, the court relied on the finding in Rent-Way I that the
asset manager was attorney-in-fact for the investors in reaching
its holding, and also cited to Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc.
(which relied on Rent-Way I as well).7  For the Turkcell court,
"[t]he fact that BPI was not the legal purchaser of Turkcell stock
71 Id. at *25.
72 Id. at *27 (quoting a declaration by the asset manager).
" Id. at*31.
74 In re Turkcell fletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353, 358(S.D.N.Y. 2002). One earlier case rejected an investment advisor as a lead plaintiff,
but the fact that the proposed lead plaintiff did not purchase for its own account was
only one of the reasons why the court rejected it. In In re Bank One Shareholders
Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000), the proposed lead plaintiff was aday-trader and a short-seller, in addition to being an asset manager. Id. at 784. The
court noted:
In addition to that trading pattern, of course Thales is not simply a buyer
for its own account, standing instead in the place of whatever number of
investors are participants in its managed fund. Taken all in all, this Court
does not view that posture as qualifying Thales for the 'most adequate
plaintiffs' designation ....
Id.
75 In re Turkcell, 209 F.R.D. at 358.
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prevents them from suing on behalf of its investors."7 6 However,
the Turkcell court seemed to be equating "legal purchaser" with
"legal owner." The asset manager in Turkcell was the
"purchaser" of the stock, as that term has been interpreted by
other courts." The asset manager had complete discretionary
authority to buy, sell, and make all the investment decisions.
Before the District of New Jersey permitted an asset
manager to serve as the lead plaintiff in Roth v. Knight Trading
Group,7" it had refused to do so in Smith v. Suprema Specialties,
Inc.79 In Smith, an asset manager with twenty-two clients, who
held the beneficial interest in the stock in question, moved to be
appointed lead plaintiff.8 0 Although in the aggregate the asset
manager had suffered the greatest financial loss and was the
presumptive lead plaintiff, another movant for lead plaintiff
attempted to rebut the presumption, arguing that the asset
manager did not function as a "single investor" and had not
submitted evidence that it had its clients' permission to move for
lead plaintiff."' The court agreed, holding the asset manager's
clients were the "actual purchasers" of the stock in question.1
2
The court further held that the mere grant of authority to invest
does not confer authority to initiate suit, and the asset manager
had not provided the court with proof of authority to file the
lawsuit.8 3 In so holding, the court relied on Rent-Way I.84 In light
of the lack of actual authority in Rent- Way II, and given the New
Jersey court's subsequent holding in Roth, which allowed an
asset manager to serve as lead plaintiff, Smith would seem to be
of little or no lasting value.
76 id.
77 See, e.g., In re UnumProvident Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 1:03-CV-049, 2003 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 24633, at *27-28 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2003) ("An investment adviser
qualifies as a 'purchaser' under the federal securities laws, and may sue in its own
name, if it has been delegated the authority to make investment decisions on behalf
of its clients.").
78 228 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D.N.J. 2002).
79 206 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D.N.J. 2002).
80 Id. at 633.
8" Id. at 634-35.
82 Id. at 634.
83 Id. at 634-35.
84 Id. at 634.
85 Lasting value or not, it was followed in at least one unreported decision. See
In re Peregrine Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02CV870-J, 2002 WL 32769239, at *15
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2002) (relying on Smith and holding lack of evidence of authority
to initiate suit on behalf of clients rendered investment advisor inadequate as a lead
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CONCLUSION
The trend of authority is to allow asset managers to serve as
lead plaintiffs or class representatives. These decisions seem
more consonant with the purpose of the federal securities laws,
which, as one court noted, is "to protect decision-makers in
securities transactions. 86  The federal securities laws are
premised on a theory of full disclosure to the market. The market
is supposed to price the securities accordingly under the theory of
full and fair disclosure. An asset manager, who has been granted
investment discretion and actually purchases the securities, even
if for the account of another, is in the best position to assess
whether it is the victim of fraud or misrepresentation and should
be accorded standing to sue.
plaintiff despite having full investment authority).
8' Alfaro v. Caprock Comm. Corp., No. 3:00-CV-1613-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21743, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000).
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